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Abstract
In today's world where distributed systems form many of our critical infrastructures, dependability outages
are becoming increasingly common. In many situations, it is necessary to not just detect a failure, but also
to diagnose the failure, i.e., to identify the source of the failure. Diagnosis is challenging since high
throughput applications with frequent interactions between the different components allow fast error
propagation. It is desirable to consider applications as black-boxes for the diagnosis process. In this
paper, we propose a Monitor architecture for diagnosing failures in large-scale network protocols. The
Monitor only observes the message exchanges between the protocol entities (PEs) remotely and does
not access internal protocol state. At runtime, it builds a causal graph between the PEs based on their
communication and uses this together with a rule base of allowed state transition paths to diagnose the
failure. The tests used for the diagnosis are based on the rule base and are assumed to have imperfect
coverage. The hierarchical Monitor framework allows distributed diagnosis handling Byzantine failures at
individual Monitors. The framework is implemented and applied to a reliable multicast protocol executing
on our campus-wide network. Fault injection experiments are carried out to evaluate the accuracy and
latency of the diagnosis.
Keywords: Distributed system diagnosis, runtime monitoring, hierarchical Monitor system, fault injection
based evaluation.
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INTRODUCTION
The wide deployment of high-speed computer networks has made distributed systems

ubiquitous in today’s connected world providing the backbone for the information infrastructure.
The infrastructure, however, is increasingly facing the challenge of dependability outages
resulting from both accidental & malicious failures, collectively referred to as failures in this
paper. The potential causes of accidental failures are hardware failures, software defects, and
operator failures, including mis-configurations, while the malicious attacks may be launched by
external or internal users. The financial consequences can be gauged from a survey by Meta
1

Group Inc. of 21 industrial sectors in 2000 [1], which found the mean loss of revenue due to an
hour of computer system downtime to be $1.01M. Compare this to the average cost of $205 per
hour of employee downtime! Also, compare the cost today to the average of $82,500 in 1993 [2]
and the trend becomes clear.
In order to build robust infrastructures capable of tolerating the two classes of failures, it is
required to provide detection and diagnosis primitives as part of a fault tolerance infrastructure.
Following the definitions in [27], a fault is an invalid state or bug underlying in the system,
which when triggered becomes an error. A failure is an external manifestation of an error at the
systems’ boundary. A failure in a distributed system may be caused by error propagation
between processes, and detected by the detection system. The role of the diagnosis system is to
identify the entity that originated the failure. The diagnosis problem is significant in distributed
applications that have many closely interacting PEs, since this facilitates error propagation. We
structure the combined system into two clearly segmented parts with well-defined mutual
interactions⎯an observer or monitor system, which provides detection and diagnosis, and an
observed or payload system, which comprises the protocol entities (PEs), i.e., the processes that
implement the functionality of the distributed system. This paper builds diagnosis functionality
on the detection framework presented in [4].
There are several design motivations for the monitor system. First, it is desirable that the
monitor system operate asynchronously to the payload system so that the system’s throughput
does not suffer due to the checking overhead. Second, there is a requirement of fast detection and
diagnosis, so that substantial damage due to cascaded failures is avoided. Third, the monitor
system is not intrusive to the payload system. This rules out the possibility of making changes to
the PEs or creating special tests that they respond to, and argues in favor of having the payload
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system be viewed as a black-box by the monitor system. While it is possible to build very
optimized and specialized mechanisms for specific applications (e.g., like in [3] with the TRAM
protocol), such solutions do not generalize well across applications. Thus, it is important to
design the Monitor system to have an application neutral architecture with ease of deployment
across applications.
In today’s distributed systems the machines on which the applications are hosted, are
heterogeneous in nature, the applications often run legacy code without the availability of their
source, the systems are of very large scales with soft real-time guarantees making the problem
challenging. In this paper, we propose a generic Monitor architecture to provide diagnosis
primitives to distributed applications, meeting all the design requirements mentioned above.
We use a hierarchical Monitor architecture to perform diagnosis of failures in the underlying
protocol. The Monitor snoops on the communication between the PEs and performs diagnosis of
the faulty PE once a failure is detected. We use the terminology “the Monitor verifies a PE” to
mean the Monitor provides the detection and the diagnosis functionalities to the PE. Once a
detection alarm is raised by a Monitor, the diagnosis protocol starts executing. For the diagnosis,
the Monitors treat the PEs as black-box and only the causal relation amongst the messages
deduced from the send-receive ordering along with a rule base containing correctness and QoS
rules are used to perform the diagnosis. For the diagnosis, the PEs are not exercised with
additional tests since that would make the Monitor system more invasive to the application
protocol. Instead state that has already been deduced by the Monitors during normal operation
through the observed external messages is used for the diagnosis process. Loose assumption
about the jitter on the communication channels, rather than the synchronous assumption, is made,
while no assumption is made on the clocks at the different PEs or Monitors. A lower level
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Monitor, called a Local Monitor (LM), directly verifies a PE, while a higher level Monitor will
match rules that span multiple LMs. The Monitor architecture is generic and applicable to a large
class of message passing based distributed applications, and it is the specification of the rule base
that makes the Monitor specialized for an application.
The Monitors coordinate to perform distributed diagnosis if the verified PEs lie under the
verification domains of different Monitors. We assume Byzantine failures may occur in the
Monitor system as well and use replication to mask them. We enforce a hybrid failure model on
the Monitors by the use an existing distributed security kernel called Trusted Timely Computing
Base (TTCB) [15].
The Monitor system is implemented and deployed on our university’s campus-wide network. It
is used to provide detection and diagnosis functionality to a streaming video application running
over a reliable multicast application called TRAM [12]. Latency and accuracy of diagnosis are
measured, using fault injection experiments. The Monitor accuracy is found to decrease with
increasing data rate using a pessimistic version of the matching algorithm. The pessmistic
version performs matching of all observed messages at the Monitor and is targeted to
environments with high failure rates. In contrast, the optimistic version of the protocol only
performs matching when failure is detected. Switching to an optimistic version gives improved
diagnosis accuracy of 85% at 175 KB/s compared to 63% in the pessimistic case, which comes at
the cost of higher latency of diagnosis.
The paper makes the following contributions:
(1) It provides a distributed protocol for accurate diagnosis of failures. The diagnosis protocol is
optimal among algorithms in its class, where the class is defined by the amount of information
used by the diagnosis algorithm.
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(2) It maintains a useful abstraction of the observer and the observed systems with non-intrusive
interactions between them.
(3) Diagnosis can be achieved in the presence of Byzantine failures in the fault tolerance
framework itself and error propagation across the entire payload system.
(4) The system’s performance and fault tolerance is demonstrated on a real-world third-party
application.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the diagnosis protocol for the
PEs assuming failure free Monitors. Section 3 deals with Monitor failures. Section 4 presents the
analysis of diagnosis accuracy. Section 5 discusses the implementation, experiments, and results.
Section 6 reviews related work and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2

DIAGNOSING FAILURES
This section details the diagnosis protocol that is executed in the system to determine the cause

of the failure. We assume in this section that diagnosis is performed by a failure free Monitor
hierarchy verifying the PEs but explain in Section 3 how diagnosis is handled in case of failures
in Monitors.
2.1

System Model

The Monitor employs a stateful model for rule matching to perform detection and diagnosis,
implying it maintains state that persists across messages. It contains a rule base consisting of
combinatorial rules (valid for all points in time in the lifetime of the application) and/or temporal
rules (valid for limited time periods). The Monitor observes only the external messages of the
PEs. It can be placed anywhere in the infrastructure but typically not co-hosted with the PEs to
avoid performance impact to the payload system. The desire to have low latency of detection and
diagnosis suggests the placement of the Monitor in the vicinity of the PEs. The Monitor
5

architecture consists of Data Capturer, Rule Matching Engine, State Maintainer, Decision
Maker and finally the Diagnosis Engine to perform diagnosis. The Data Capturer snoops over
the communication medium to obtain messages. It can be implemented using active forwarding
by the PEs to the Monitor or by a passive snooping mechanism. In passive snooping the Monitor
captures the communication over the channel without any cooperation from the PEs, e.g.,
through the promiscuous mode in a LAN or using router support. In the active forwarding mode,
the PEs (or an agent resident on the same host) forwards each message to the overseeing
Monitor. The message exchanges correspond to events in the rule base of the Monitor. The Rule
Matching engine is used to match the incoming events with rules for those events in the rule
base. The State Maintainer maintains the state transition diagram (STD) and the current state of
each verified PE. Finally, the Decision Maker is responsible for making decisions based on the
outcome from the Rule Matching Engine. The Diagnosis Engine is triggered when a failure is
detected and it uses state information from the State Maintainer to make diagnosis decisions. The
previous Monitor architecture in [4] has been extended to add the diagnosis functionality.
The system comprises of multiple Monitors logically organized into Local, Intermediate, and
Global Monitors. The Local Monitors (LMs) directly verify the PEs. An Intermediate Monitor
(IM) collects information from several Local Monitors. An LM filters and sends only aggregate
information to the IM. There may be multiple levels of IMs depending on the number of PEs,
their geographical dispersion, and the capacity of the host on which an IM is executing. There is
only a single Global Monitor (GM), which only verifies the overall properties of the network. An
example of the hierarchical setup with a single level of IM used in our experiments is shown in
Figure 3. The Monitor’s functionality of detection and diagnosis is completely asynchronous to
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the protocol. Each Monitor maintains a local logical clock (LC) for each PE it is verifying, which
it updates at each observable event (send or receive) for that PE (similar to Lamport’s clock[40]).
We assume that PEs can fail arbitrarily exhibiting Byzantine failures. Errors can propagate
from one PE to another through the messages which are exchanged between them. Failures in the
PEs are detected by the Monitor infrastructure by comparing the observed message exchanges
against the normal rule base as opposed to the strict rule base used during diagnosis (Section
2.2.4). An anomaly in the behavior of the PEs detected by flagging of a rule triggers the
diagnosis procedure. We assume that jitter on PE →Monitor link is bounded by phase(∆t). We
further explain in Section 2.2.2 the need for such an assumption. It is important to note that this
assumption is weaker than complete synchrony.
2.2

Diagnosis Protocol

Diagnosis in a distributed manner based on observing only external message exchanges poses
significant challenges. It is essential to consider the phenomenon of propagated errors to avoid
penalizing a correct node in which the failure first manifested as a deviation from the normal
protocol behavior. As the Monitor has access only to external message exchanges and not to
internal state, diagnosis must be based on these messages alone. In other words, the Monitor does
not have perfect observability of the payload system’s state. The PEs may lie within the domains
of different LMs. In such cases, the diagnosis is a distributed effort spanning multiple Monitors
at different levels (Local, Intermediate, and Global). In order to identify the faulty PE from
among a set of suspect PEs, each PE is subjected to a test procedure. Since the Monitor treats
PEs as black-boxes it is thus unaware of the valid request-response for the protocol and cannot
send any explicit test message to the PEs. Moreover, the PE may not currently be in the same
state as the one in which the fault was triggered. A failure manifested at the PE could be because
7

of a fault which originated at this PE or because of error propagation through a message which
the PE received. If the error is propagated through a message then it must causally precede the
message which resulted in failure detection. Causal order is obtained using the logical clock
maintained by the Monitor for each verified PE, which is used to construct the causal graph.
2.2.1

Causal Graph

The causal graph is updated during the normal operation of the protocol. A causal graph at a
Monitor m is denoted by CGm and is a graph (V, E) where (i) V contains all the PEs verified by
m; (ii) An edge e contained in E, between vertices v1 and v2 (which represent PEs) indicates
interaction between v1 and v2 and contains state about all observed message exchanges between
the corresponding PEs including the logical clock (LC) at each end. We thus establish a
correspondence between a PE in the payload system and a node in the causal graph. Henceforth,
we use the term “detect a node” to mean detect a failure in the PE corresponding to the node. The
edges are directed, and are stored separately as incoming and outgoing, with respect to a given
node. The edges shall be referred to as links from now on. The links are also time-stamped with
the local (physical) time at the Monitor, at which the link is created. An example of a causal
graph is given in Figure 1 for the sequence of events described on the lower left corner.
Link Table at B

B
m1

A

LC1

m3

LC2

LC1

m2

LC2

m4

LC3

m2

For example in the Link Table for node C,
message ‘4’ is assigned a logical clock time
3. Message m3 is causally preceded by

m4

Link Table at A
m1

m1

message m2 which is causally preceded by

m3

C

• A sends a message ‘m1’ to B.

Link Table at C

• B sends message ‘m2’ to C.

m2

LC1

• C sends message ‘m3’ to A followed
by message ‘m4’ to B.

m3

LC2

m4

LC3

Figure 1: A sample causal graph

message m1. The messages may be received
in different order at the Monitor because of
the asynchronous nature of links.
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2.2.2

Cycle and Phase

In modern distributed protocols, with thousands of communicating protocol entities, testing all
the causally preceding messages is not feasible. We define a time window over which the
diagnosis protocol tests nodes. This time window is called a Protocol Cycle to differentiate it
from a graph theoretic cycle in the causal graph. The start point of the Protocol Cycle denotes
how far the diagnosis algorithm should go in history to detect faulty nodes. (Henceforth, if there
is no scope for confusion, we use the term cycle as shorthand for protocol cycle.) Cycle
boundaries can be decided either by using the STD of the application or error latency of the
application in actual physical time or logical time. First, we present the definition using the STD.
In the Monitor design, a transition from one state to the next state depends solely on the current
state and the event that occurs in the current state. Let there be n PEs verified by the Monitor
infrastructure. A reduced STD is maintained at the LM for every verified PEk, denoted STDk.
Owing to the reduced and finite nature of the STD, it can be assumed that there are repetitions in
the set of states traversed by a PE over a long enough time interval.
There could be several possible runs of

E8

s6
E6

s7

E7

s3

different durations for a given PE each

s5
E 10

E9
E3

corresponding

E4
E5

s8
s4

s2
E2

E1

to

a

complete

task

(transaction) as defined in the protocol, e.g.,

E 11

a complete round of data and ack exchange.

s1

Figure 2: Sample STD for a PE P1,
illustration of Protocol Cycle
Let S1k denote the starting state of the PEk being verified. At an arbitrary starting time t0, the
G

states of the n PEs would be Sinit = {S11, S21, S31,…, Sn1}. We define the protocol cycle as the
G

completion of all the possible runs starting from Sinit . Each protocol cycle will encapsulate several
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graph cycles each of which includes the start state of the particular PE. Finding a protocol cycle
is NP-complete since the known NP-complete problem of finding the Hamiltonian cycle can be
reduced to it in polynomial time.
When a failure is detected in protocol cycle Ci, the checking has to be done till the beginning of
Ci-1 for a deterministic bug. The model for the deterministic bug is that if it manifests itself in
state Sij on receipt of event Ek for PEi, then it must manifest itself every time PEi goes through
the same state and event. For a non-deterministic Heisenbug, the determination may have to go
back to further cycle boundaries since by definition, a non-deterministic may not manifest itself
repeatedly under the same conditions (same state and event). Alternate strategies may be needed
if the number of states to be examined becomes too large through this approach. Then we can use
the upper bound on the error detection latency in the system (e.g., as given through analysis in
[25]) to come up with the cycle boundary. If we can provide a bound that any error in the
application will manifest in time δ, we can limit the messages which need to be checked for
errors as being no farther back in (physical) time than δ. If proactive recovery measures, such as
periodic rebooting [41], are used, then the time points at which the proactive recovery is
performed can be taken as cycle boundaries. This is motivated by the claim that latent errors are
eliminated at the proactive recovery points.
Let us consider two links in the causal graph L that have been time-stamped with logical times
tL1 and tL2 by the Monitor. Given tL2 > tL1 we cannot conclude anything about the actual order of
these events. As the system is asynchronous and not FIFO, a PE v sending two messages to PE w
can result in the messages being received out of order at w, or being received in order at w, but
out of order at the Monitor. Instead of the synchrony assumption, consider the following more
relaxed assumption. Consider that a Monitor M is verifying two PEs – sender S and receiver R.
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The assumption required by the diagnosis protocol is that the variation in the latency on the S-M
channel as well as the variation in the sum of the latency in the S-R and R-M channels is going to
be less than a constant ∆t, called the phase, which is known a priori. If messages M1 and M2,
corresponding to two send events at S, are received at Monitor M1 at (logical) times t1 and t2, it is
guaranteed that send event M1 happened before M2 if tL2 ≥ tL1+∆t.
2.2.3

Suspicion Set

Flagging of a rule corresponding to a PE represented by node N in the causal graph indicates a
failure F and starts the diagnosis procedure. Henceforth, we will use the expression “failure at
node N” for a failure detected at the PE corresponding to the causal graph node N. Diagnosis
starts at the node where the rule is initially flagged, proceeding to other nodes suspected for the
failure at node N. All such nodes along with the link information (i.e. state and event type) form
a Suspicion Set for failure F at node N denoted as SSFN.
The suspicion set of a node N consists of all the nodes which have sent it messages in the past
denoted by SSN. If a failure is detected at node N then initially SSFN={SSN}. Let SSN consist of
nodes {n1, n2…, nk}. Each of the nodes in SSFN is tested using a test procedure which is discussed
in Section 2.2.4. If a node ni ∈SSFN is found to be fault-free then it is removed from the suspicion
set resulting in contraction of suspicion set. If none of the nodes is found to be faulty then in the
next iteration suspicion set for the failure F is expanded to include the suspicion set of all the
nodes which existed in SSN in the previous iteration. Thus, in the next iteration SSFN = {SSn1,
SSn2…, SSnk}. Arriving at the set of nodes that have sent messages to N in this time window is
done from the causal graph. Consider that the packet that triggered diagnosis is sent by N at time

τS. Then, all the senders of all incoming links into node N with time-stamp t satisfying C ≤ t
≤τS+∆t are added to the suspicion list, where ∆t is the phase parameter and C is the cycle
11

boundary. The procedure of contracting and expanding the Suspicion Set repeats recursively
until the faulty node is identified or the cycle boundary is reached thereby terminating the
diagnosis.
2.2.4

Test Procedure

We define the test procedure for a PE to be a set of rules to be matched based on the state of the
PE as maintained in the causal graph. This set of rules constitutes the strict rule base (SRB) and
like the normal rule base, used for error detection, consists of temporal and combinatorial rules
for expected patterns of message exchanges. The SRB is based on the intuition that a violation
does not deterministically lead to a violation of the protocol correctness, and in many cases gets
masked. However, in the case of a fault being manifested through the violation of a rule in the
normal rule base as a failure, a violation of a rule in the SRB is regarded as a contributory factor.
The strict rules are of the form
<Type> <State1> <Event1> <Count1> <State2> <Event2> <Count2>
where, (State1, Event1, Count1) forms the precondition to be matched, while (State2, Event2,
Count2) forms the post-condition that should be satisfied for the node to be deemed not faulty.
SRB of form <state S, event E, count C> refers to the fact that the event E should have been
detected in the state S at least count C number of times. Note that a PE may appear multiple
times in the Suspicion Set, e.g., in different states, and may be checked multiple times during the
diagnosis procedure. Also, the tests are run on state maintained at the Monitor without involving
the PE, thus satisfying the design goal of non-intrusiveness.
When an SRB rule is used to test a given link li in the causal graph, it uses as pre- and postconditions in the rule events over a logical window of ±∆t, the phase, measured from the logical
time of li. This is attributed to the assumption of jitter bound on the communication link, namely,
12

that a message at the Monitor cannot arrive out of order with respect to another message more
than ∆t away, originated at the same PE. Each rule in SRB has some coverage to verify a
particular PE because it only tests a specific state and event. Therefore, a message sent by an
entity in the Suspicion Set must be tested by running multiple rules from the SRB on it. The
diagnosis is therefore probabilistic according to the traditional definition [22]. However the PEs
are deterministically diagnosed as faulty or correct. We develop an analytical model on these
assumptions in Section 4.
Like the normal rule base, the rules in the SRB are dependent on the state and the event of the
link but the number of rules is typically much larger than that in the normal rule base. Hence, it
is conceivable that the system administrator would not tolerate the overhead of checking against
the SRB during normal protocol operation. A new diagnosis procedure is started for every rule
that is flagged at the Monitor. Multiple faults manifesting nearly concurrently would result in
multiple rules being flagged, leading to separate and independent diagnosis procedures for each
of them.
2.2.5

Diagnosis Protocol: Flow

This section illustrates the flow of control of the diagnosis protocol and the interactions in the
Monitor infrastructure to arrive at a correct diagnosis. We illustrate the set of steps for a failure at
a single PE. The protocol for distributed diagnosis amongst the Monitors comes into play when a
suspect node identified by an LM lies outside its domain, i.e. the PE required to be tested is not
verified by this LM. The LM does not contain causal graph information for the suspect node, and
hence requests the corresponding LM verifying the suspect node to carry out the test (step 4).
1. A failure F at PE N is detected by the local Monitor LMi verifying it.
2. LMi constructs the suspicion set SSN for the failure and adds it to SSFN.
13

3. For every N'∈ SSN that belongs to the domain of LM1 , LM1 tests N' for correctness for the
suspect link L' using rules from the SRB for that particular event and state. If N' is not faulty,
then it is removed from SSN and SSN' is added to the SSFN queue.
4. For every N'' belonging to SSN that is not under the domain of LMi but under the domain of
another Monitor LMj, LMi sends a test request for N′′ and faulty link L'' recursively to higher
level Monitors till a common parent for LMi and LMj is found, which routes it to LMj. LMj
tests N'' and sends the result of the test back to LMi through the same route. If N'' is not
faulty, then LMj also sends the suspicion set corresponding to link L′′ for N''.
5. The diagnosis procedure repeats recursively till a node is diagnosed as faulty, or till the cycle
boundary is reached. In the first case, the node corresponding to which the link is diagnosed
as faulty due to violation of rules in the SRB is considered to be faulty. In the latter case, the
diagnosis procedure terminates unsuccessfully.
3

DIAGNOSIS IN THE PRESENCE OF FAULTY MONITORS
An external fault-free “oracle” performing detection and diagnosis although desirable, is not

realistic. In our framework, the Monitors are also considered susceptible to faults. The goal of
this section is to show how the diagnosis of faulty PEs can be carried out in face of arbitrary
failures of the Monitors. We assume Monitors are susceptible to runtime Byzantine failures (e.g.,
due to synchronization errors). In our design, faults in the Monitors are not diagnosed, but
masked.
3.1

Faults at Local Monitors

If an LM is faulty then it may exhibit arbitrary behavior by sending false alarms to higher level
Monitors or may drop a valid alarm. In such scenarios an LM cannot be allowed to perform the
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diagnosis procedure. We use replication to mask failures at the LMs, by allowing multiple LMs
to verify a PE.
Assuming there can be failures on up to f

GM

LMs, each PE is verified by 2f+1 LMs,
IM1

IM2

LM1

LM2

IM2f’+1

IMn

LM2f+1

PE
PE
Verification Domain for Monitors

LMn

called the Collaborative LM Set (denoted
CSLM). An IM can accept that there is an
error in the PE being monitored, if it

PE

receives f+1 identical alarms from the

Set of 2f+1 Monitors

different LMs verifying the same PE.
Figure 3: Redundancy in the Monitor
hierarchy
Note that if there is a set of entities (the LMs) whose responses are “voted on” by a fault-free
“oracle” (the IM), then only 2f+1 entities are required under the Byzantine fault model. The
communication between LMs and IMs is authenticated, to avoid multiple alarms being sent by
the same LM. Although all the LMs in the CSLM verify the same PE, they are spatially disjoint
leading to possibly different views of the state of the PE. However, for our system, we need that
all correct LMs in a CSLM agree on the failure alarms they send to the IM. Another requirement
is defining an order among the alarms sent out by the LMs in a CSLM.
The solution to both issues is based on an atomic or total order multicast protocol (see
definition in [13]). This problem is known to be equivalent to consensus [18], which requires a
minimum of 3f+1 process replicas to be solvable in asynchronous systems with Byzantine faults
[14]. We reduce this number of LM replicas to 2f+1 using an existing method called the
architectural-hybrid fault model [17] (Section 3.3.1).
The algorithm used by the LMs in a CSLM to agree in an alarm is the following. When the
Monitor is initialized, each LM starts a counter with 0. When a rule in an LM raises an alarm, it
15

atomically multicasts that alarm to all LMs in CSLM (including itself). When the atomic multicast
delivers an LM the (f+1)th copy of the same alarm sent by different LMs in CSLM, it gives that
alarm the number indicated by the counter, increases the counter, and sends the message to the
IM. It guarantees that all correct LMs agree on the same alarms with a unique order number,
ensuring an atomic order. Therefore, the algorithm guarantees that an IM receives identical
alarms from all correct LMs verifying a PE.
3.1.1

TTCB and architectural-hybrid fault model

In this paper, we use the architectural-hybrid fault model provided by a distributed security
kernel called the Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB). The notion of architectural-hybrid
fault model is simple: we assume different fault models for different parts of the system.
Specifically, we assume that most of the system can fail arbitrarily, or in a Byzantine manner,
but also that there is a distributed security kernel in the system (the TTCB) that can only fail by
crashing [15]. The TTCB can be considered a “hard-core” component that provides a small set of
secure services, such as Byzantine resilient consensus, to a collection of external entities, like the
LMs. These entities communicate in a world full of threats, some of them may even be malicious
and try to cheat, but the TTCB is an “oracle” that correct entities can trust and use for the
efficient execution of their protocol.
Host 1
Processes

Host 2
Processes

Host n
Processes

The design and implementation of the
TTCB was discussed at length in [16] and

OS

Local
TTCB

OS

Local
TTCB

OS

Local
TTCB

TTCB Control Channel
Payload Network

here we give a brief overview relevant to its
application in the Monitor system.

Figure 4: Architecture of n hosts with a
TTCB
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The local TTCB components are connected using a dedicated channel (Figure 4) The local
TTCBs can be protected by being inside some kind of software secure compartment or hardware
appliance, like a security coprocessor. The security of the control channel can be guaranteed
using a private LAN.
3.1.2

Atomic multicast protocol

The atomic multicast primitive provides the following properties: (1) All correct recipients
deliver the same messages; (2) If the sender is correct, then the correct recipients deliver the
sender’s message; (3) All messages are delivered in the same order by all correct recipients. The
Byzantine-resilient atomic multicast tolerant to f out of 2f+1 faulty replicas is presented in detail
in [17]. Here we describe briefly how it is applied to the Monitor system. Notice that only the
nodes with LMs need to have a local TTCB, not the nodes with IMs or the GM. The reason is
that the local TTCBs at the different entities need to be connected through a dedicated control
channel. While it may be feasible to connect the LMs monitoring a specific PE cluster, which are
likely to be geographically closely placed, through such a control channel, it is unwieldy for IMs
that are unlikely to have geographical proximity.
The core of the solution we use is one of the simple services provided by the TTCB, the
Trusted Multicast Ordering (TMO) [15]. Being a TTCB service, its code lies inside the local
TTCBs and its communication goes in the TTCB control channel. When an LM wants to
atomically multicast a message M, it gives the TMO a hash of M obtained using a cryptographic
hash function, e.g., SHA-1. A cryptographic hash function can be used as a unique identifier for
a message since it has essentially two properties: (1) its output has constant length (160 bits for
SHA-1); (2) it is computationally infeasible to find two different inputs that hash to the same
output. When an LM receives a message M it also gives the TMO a hash of the message. Notice
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that the messages are sent through the normal payload network, i.e., outside the TTCB. However,
these channels guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the messages. These channels could be
implemented using SSL or TLS. Finally, when the TTCB has information that f LMs received M,
it gives M & all LMs in CSLM the next order number.
3.2

Faults at the Intermediate Monitors

Next we augment the model to allow IM failures by having a redundant number of IMs. To
tolerate f’ faults at the IM level at least 2f’+1 IM replicas must be used. Therefore all LMs in a
Collaborative LM Set (CSLM ) send alarms to all IMs in a Collaborative IM Set, denoted by
CSIM. Output of replicas is voted on by a simple voter (GM in our case). The simplicity of the
GM and the fact that it is not distributed makes it reasonable to assume that efforts can
reasonably be made to make it fault free. Secure coding methodologies, based on formal
verification and static code analysis, can be used to build a fault-free GM. Possibility of faults in
Monitors, forces an LM in CSLM to accept a test request only if it receives f+1 identical test
requests from Monitors in CSIM. An alternative design choice would be to control the entire
diagnosis protocol from the lower level (failure prone) Monitors through the use of consensus.
This was considered to have unacceptable overhead in number of messages and rounds for
consensus, which would be required for every member of the suspicion set. Also, if the suspicion
set spans boundaries of the LM, higher level Monitors would anyway be needed for distributed
diagnosis.
3.3

Flow of Control of Diagnosis with Failing Monitors

Assume that CSIM initiates the diagnosis.
1. Failure F at PE N is detected by the CSLM verifying it, which constructs the suspicion set SSN
and adds it to SSFN.
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2. The LMs assign an order to the alarm using the atomic broadcast protocol and send an alarm
along with SSFN up to all the IMs in CSIM.
3. The IMs wait for f+1 identical alarms and then start the diagnosis procedure.
4.

For every N' ∈ SSFN the (correct) IMs in a CSIM send a test request to the CSLM for verifying
N’.

5. Each LM ∈ CSLM that receives f+1 identical test requests from different IMs in CSIM tests N'
for correctness of the suspect link L' using multiple rules from the SRB for the particular
event and state of the link.
6. The test results are sent above to the IMs in CSIM who vote on the f+1 identical responses to
decide if N’ is faulty. If N' is not faulty, then it is removed from SSN and SSN' is added to the
SSFN.
7. If a PE N'' lies outside the verification domain of the IMs in CSIM then a test request for N′′
and faulty link L'' is sent recursively to higher level Monitors, which send the request down
the tree to the relevant set of Local Monitors verifying N''. The result of the test is sent back
to the IMs through the same route. If N'' is not faulty, then the corresponding suspicion set is
also sent along.
8. The diagnosis procedure repeats recursively until a node is diagnosed as faulty, or until the
cycle boundary is reached.
4

ANALYSIS OF DIAGNOSIS ACCURACY
For easier understanding and comparison, we follow a similar notation to that in [26]. Consider

a k-regular directed graph with a node representing a PE and an edge representing message
exchange between the PEs. A node is faulty with probability λ. An error can propagate through a
message sent by the node with probability ρ, given that the node is faulty. The probability of
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error propagation through the message is ρλ. An error in the node can be caused by a fault in the
node or due to an error propagated through one of the incoming links. A test executed on the
node has a fault detection coverage ci if the node ni is faulty (i.e., probability of detecting a faulty
node is ci) and a coverage di if the node has an error which has propagated from some incoming
links. For an ideal test, ci=1 and di=1. Let c and d be the average values for the detection
coverage for fault and propagated error over all nodes. Let the number of tests from SRB
performed on the node be T and the total number of nodes be N. Each test yields an output O ∈
{0, 1}, where an output 0 means the node passes the test and 1 that it fails the test. Assume that a
node is determined to be faulty if there are z or more ones in the total number of tests, z ∈ (0,T).
Let π be the event that a node is faulty and π′ be the complement event. Based on the model:
A = Prob(test=1|π) = c ; [1(a)]
B = Prob(test=1| π′) = d(1-(1- ρλ)k) ; [1(b)]
Prob(z-ones| π) = C(T,z) Az (1-A)T-z (where C is the binomial coefficient) ; [1(c)]
Prob(z-ones| π′) = C(T,z) Bz (1-B)T-z ; [1(d)]
One figure of merit for the diagnosis process is the probability of detecting the original faulty
node causing the failure. The posterior probability is given by:
Prob(π| z-ones) = Prob(z-ones| π).Prob(π) / Prob(z-ones) ; where Prob(z-ones) is given by
1(c).λ + 1(d).(1-λ) using the total probability formula.

λ C(T, z) Az (1− A)T −z
=
=
λ C(T, z) Az (1− A)T −z + (1− λ)C(T, z) Bz (1− B)T −z

1
(1 − λ ) ⎛ B ⎞ ⎛ 1 − B ⎞
1+
⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎟
λ ⎝ A ⎠ ⎝1− A ⎠
z

T −z

; [1(e)]

This equation matches with the one derived by Fussel and Rangarajan (FR) [22] with the
following mapping: R (number of rounds) there maps to T here, since in each round of the FR
algorithm, the same test is performed.
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Now consider B from equation 1(b)
B = d(1-(1-ρλ)k), taking the number of messages to be very large we can assume that as kÆ∞
reduces to d(1-ekρλ) because ρλ Æ0 . We can rewrite the equation 1(e) as:
Prob(π| z-ones) = 1 / 1 + F(z) ; where F(z) = ((1-λ)/ λ).(B/A)z .((1-B)/(1-A))T-z
We claim that 1(e) is a monotonically increasing function of z. Note that A and B ∈ (0, 1).
Also, for realistic situations, the probability of a node being faulty is much greater than the
probability of a propagated error affecting a node (this is a common assumption in the fault
tolerance literature [9][28]). Any reasonable diagnosis test should be able to distinguish between
a node being the originator of a fault (high probability of π=1) and one which is the victim of a
propagated error (low probability of π=1). Therefore, A>B. Let us represent F(z) as kbzµT-z. For
A>B, b<1 and µ>1 and therefore Prob(π| z-ones) increases with z. This can also be proved
through showing d(Prob(π| z-ones))/dz > 0 . This implies that the higher the value of z for a fixed
T the greater is the confidence in the diagnosis process. In other words, the diagnosis process is
well behaved as per the definition in [26].
Theorem: The diagnosis algorithm provides asymptotically correct diagnosis for N→∞ for k≥2
and T≥ α(N)log(N), where α(N)→∞ arbitrarily slowly as N→∞. It is also optimal in diagnosis
accuracy among diagnosis algorithms in its class.
Proof: For this, we use the result proved in [26] and simply map our algorithm’s testing behavior
to theirs.
In [26], the number of tests grows with N as α(N)log(N) and thus asymptotically (w.r.t. N) also
tends to ∞, though the growth is not as fast as N. Our algorithm falls in the 3AM (m-threshold
local diagnosis) category as defined in [26] since (i) all testing is done with local knowledge, and
(ii) a threshold number of tests needs to fail for an entity to be diagnosed as faulty. The posterior
21

probability given by equation 1(e) matches the posterior probability of the FR algorithm [22].
Hence the algorithm tends to perfect behavior asymptotically when k≥2 and T grows as
α(N)log(N). Note that our diagnosis algorithm is also asymptotically correct for asymptotic
lim Prob(π | z − ones) approaches 1. Eqn.
behavior of T, independent of N since equation 1(e), lim
T →∞
z→T

[1(e)] is an increasing function of z. Hence, we find the value z = zth which provides Prob(π| zones) = 0.5 and set the algorithm to conclude the node is faulty if z > zth and non-faulty
otherwise. Equating eqn. 1(e) to 0.5 and simplifying we get:
1− λ
log(
)

1− B
log(
)
λ
−
1
A
+T
zth =
A(1 − B)
A(1 − B)
log(
)
log(
)
(1 − A) B
(1 − A) B

Therefore, using the property of Prob(π| z-ones) being an increasing function of z and Theorem 1
in [42], we conclude that our diagnosis algorithm is optimal in its class 3AM.
5

IMPLEMENTATION, EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS

The diagnosis protocol implementation is demonstrated by running a streaming video application
on top of TRAM. TRAM is a tree based reliable multicast protocol consisting of a single sender,
multiple repair heads (RH), and receivers [12]. Data is multicast by the sender to the receivers
with RH(s) being responsible for local repairs of lost packets. An ack message is sent by a
receiver after every ack window worth of packets has been received, or an ack interval timer
goes off. The RHs aggregate acks from all its members and send an aggregate ack up to the
higher level to avoid the problem of ack implosion. During the start of the session, beacon
packets are sent by the sender to advertise the session and to invite receivers. Receivers join
using head bind (HB) messages and are accepted using head acknowledge (HA) messages from
the sender or an RH. TRAM entities periodically exchange hello messages to detect failures.
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The Monitor is given the SRB along with the STD and the normal rule base as input. An
example of a temporal rule in the normal rule base is that the number of data packets observed
during a time period of 5000 ms should be between 30 and 500. The thresholds are calculated
using the maximum and minimum data rates required by TRAM as specified by the user.
Another example is that there should not be two head bind messages sent by a receiver within
500ms during the data receiving state as the receiver could be malicious and be frequently
switching RHs. An example of a strict rule used in our experiments for the sender is SR1 : HI S2
E11 1 S2 E9 1. If in state S2, the receiver has received a data packet (E11) say with linkID as d
then there must be an ack packet within the phase interval around d. This rule ensures the
receiver sends an ack packet on receiving data packet(s). Another SRB rule bounds the hello to
be only sent when an entity is in the data transmission-reception state to prevent a malicious
receiver from hello flooding. In our experiments the number of SRB rules to test a link varied
from 4 to 8 depending on the state of the link.
5.1

Optimistic and Pessimistic Link Building

During the normal operation of the protocol, the Monitor adopts a lazy approach
(euphemistically, optimistic approach) to build the causal graph. Each incoming (outgoing)
message to (from) a node is stored in a vector of incoming (outgoing) links for that node. A
linkID (logical time stamp) is assigned to the link along with the physical time, state, and event
type. Link contains two IDs, one for the node which sent it and another for the receiving node.
For this link to be completed in the causal graph, a matching is required between the sending and
the receiving PEs’ messages. The link A→B will be matched once the message sent by A and the
corresponding one received by B are seen at the Monitor. Matching all the incoming packets
during runtime, referred to as the pessimistic approach, entails an enormous overhead. This
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approach results in low diagnosis latency but also results in some links not being matched at
runtime due to overload thereby causing a drop in the accuracy of the diagnosis protocol. Note
that the matched links are not used if a failure is not detected in the same cycle. Hence, in the
optimistic approach, at runtime, the Monitor simply stores the link in the causal graph and marks
it as being unmatched. Link matching is performed when diagnosis is triggered on failure. We
perform experiments give a comparative evaluation of the optimistic and the pessimistic
approaches.
5.2

Protocol State Reduction

The Monitor processes only the external messages as observed by it and does not use the
internal states of the PE’s. As a result, Monitor maintains a reduced state transition diagram of
the PE for monitoring purposes.
The number of states in a protocol-specification can be very large and hence, for formal
verification of protocols, numerous methods have been presented to reduce the number of states,
e.g.,

partial-order reduction [36], reachability analysis [37] and symbolic model-checking

[38][39]. However, for the Monitor system, we develop a tool specific to our requirement. This
tool takes the external messages and the rule base specification as inputs and derives the reduced
state diagram for each PE through a two-step process.
External Messages
Rule Base
STD ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯
→ STD ' ⎯⎯⎯→
STD ''
STD is the entire state transition diagram, STD′ is created by considering only the external

protocol messages, and STD′′ is created to contain only the states which appear in the rules in the
rule base. For any input protocol, the tool is used to reduce the states, given the external
messages and the rule specifications. Thus the Monitor system can be applied to different
applications for which the state transition diagram is available. We have applied this
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methodology on SIP and TRAM while the experimental results are presented only for TRAM in
the interest of space.
5.3

Fault Model & Fault Injection

For exercising the diagnosis protocol, we perform fault injection in the header of the TRAM
packets transmitted by the sender. It must be noted that the faults are considered to be accidental
faults, which may be of arbitrary nature. Malicious nodes launching deliberate attacks on the
system are beyond the scope of this paper. The Monitor inspects only the header and is not aware
of the payload. Hence the faults are only injected into the packet header. The fault is injected by
changing bits in the header after the PE has sent the message. Note that the emulated faults are
not simply message errors, but may be symptomatic of faults in the protocol itself. For example,
a faulty receiver may send a Nack instead of an Ack on successfully receiving a data packet.
Errors in message transmission can indeed be detected by checksum computed on the header.
However, the Monitor is responsible for detecting & diagnosing errors in the protocol itself,
which are clearly outside the purview of checksum. As explained previously, the faults at the
Monitor level are masked through replication. The strict rules are used to diagnose the faults with
each rule having some coverage. We use the following kind of injections for a burst length
period of time:(a)Stuck-At injection: For all packets in the burst length a randomly selected
header field value is changed to a random but valid value. (b) Directed Injection: For each packet
a specific header field is chosen for one experiment and changed to a random but valid value,
with different values in different runs. (c) Specific Injection: Specific injections consist of slow
data rate, dropping acks, and hello message flooding. Burst error is chosen as the fault model
over single error since the protocol is robust enough that single errors are almost always tolerated
by inbuilt mechanisms in the protocol.
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5.4

Test Set Up and Topology

Figure 5(b) illustrates the topology used for the accuracy and the latency experiments on TRAM
with components distributed over the campus network (henceforth called TRAM-D), while
Figure 5(a) shows the topology for the local deployment of TRAM (TRAM-L). TRAM-D is
important since a real deployment will likely have receivers distant from the sender. TRAM-L
lets us control the environment and therefore run a more extensive set of tests (e.g., with a large
range of data rates). The PEs and the LMs are capable of failing, while we assume for these
experiments that the IMs and the GM are fault free. The sender, the receivers, and the RHs do
active forwarding of the packet to the respective LMs. The min. data rate in TRAM needed to
support the quality of the video application is set at 25 Kbps. The Monitors are on the same LAN
which is different from the LAN on which the PEs are located. The routers are interconnected
through 1Gbps links and each cluster machine is connected to a router through a 100Mbps link.
GM
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PE
PE

mseepc3

IM

msee-cluster

IM

mseepc1 LM
1

LM1

LM3

LM3

in-cluster
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S
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Figure 5: Topology used for accuracy and latency experiments in (a) TRAM-L (b) TRAMD
5.5

Accuracy and Latency Results for TRAM‐L

We measure the accuracy and latency for the diagnosis algorithm on the TRAM protocol
through fault injection in the header of sender packets. We consider a single receiver receiving
packets from an RH which is connected to the sender. Accuracy is defined as the ratio of the
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number of correct diagnosis to the total number of diagnosis protocols that were triggered. This
definition eliminates any detection inaccuracy from the diagnosis performance. Diagnosis
accuracy decreases if the algorithm terminates without diagnosing any node as faulty
(incomplete) or if it flags a correct node to be faulty (incorrect). Latency is defined as the time
elapsed between the initiation of diagnosis and diagnosing a node as being faulty, either correctly
or incorrectly, or incomplete termination of the algorithm. We perform experiments with both
the optimistic and the pessimistic approach of link building. There are thus two dimensions to the
experiments – the link building approach (abbreviated as Opt and Pes) and the fault injection
strategy (abbreviated as, SA for Stuck-at, Dir for Directed, and Spec for Specific). In the interest
of space a representative sample of results is shown. The results are plotted for Opt-SA, Opt-Dir,
and Pes-Dir with a fixed burst length of 300ms for each injected fault. Inter packet delay is
varied to achieve the desired increase in the data rate. Delay of d is inserted using Gaussian
random variable with mean d and standard deviation 0.01d. Each point is averaged over 4
injections and between 20 and 58 diagnosis instances, depending on the number of detections,
which in turn depends on the rate of incoming faulty packets.
Figure 6 shows that for Pes-Dir accuracy is

Diagnosis Accuracy (%)

100

a monotonically decreasing function with

80
60

data rate. Diagnosis accuracy drops to a low

40
Pes-Dir

20

Opt-Dir

of 33% for data rate at 355 KByte/sec.

Opt-SA

0
0

100

200

300

400

Data Rate (KByte/sec)

Figure 6: Variation of Accuracy with
Data Rate
Rate mismatch between the matching of links for causal graph creation (slower process) and
the arrival of packets at high data rates (faster process) causes this decrease. Lack of adequate
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buffer causes packet drops leading to missing links in the causal graph leading to a drop in
accuracy. Another factor is lack of synchronization between the causal graph formation process
and the suspicion set creation and testing process. Thus, the latter may be triggered before the
former completes, leading to inaccuracies.
For Opt-Dir, the accuracy is high for small data rate but decreases with the increase in data
rate. Unlike Pes-Dir, here the accuracy does not drop below 80%. The link matching and the
causal graph completion are triggered when the diagnosis starts, and the diagnosis algorithm tests
the links only after the causal graph is complete resulting in higher accuracy compared to PesDir. This advantage becomes significant at high data rates. Also, beyond a threshold, further
increasing the data rate does not affect the latency because the number of incorrect packets
increases, which helps diagnosis because the current algorithm stops as soon as a single faulty
link is identified. The accuracy of Opt-SA is slightly lower than that of Opt-Dir since in the
former, the same message type is injected for the entire burst. If a rule for the message type does
not exist in the SRB, the diagnosis is incomplete.
Figure 7 (a) graphs the latency of diagnosis with increasing data rate. Notice the significantly
higher latency for the optimistic case compared to the pessimistic one. We can see that for the
Pes-Dir case, the latency increases with data rate which is expected because there are more
packets to be tested by each rule in the SRB. Latency tends to saturate at high data rates because
of incomplete causal graph leading to an inaccurate early termination. On the other hand in the
Opt-Dir scenario, the latency keeps increasing with data rate. This is attributed to the lazy link
matching which happens during diagnosis, high data rate causes more packets to be matched
leading to high latency.
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Effect of burst length: We study the impact of burst length on diagnosis accuracy for the
pessimistic and the optimistic case. We keep the data rate low at 15 KBytes/sec to isolate the
effects due to high data rate. Diagnosis as shown in Figure 7 is accurate for low and high values
of burst length. For small burst length, a small number of incorrect packets gets injected leading
to a low entropy in the payload system which is easy to detect. As the burst length increases,
more incorrect packets are received by the Monitor which increases the entropy and hence
decreases the accuracy. Beyond a certain burst length, more incorrect packets come in, helping in
diagnosis. A more “systems level” explanation for the increasing part of the curve on the right
side is that as the burst length increases, the proportion of SRB rules that match across the
boundary of the burst length decreases. These are the SRB rules that are likely to lead to
incorrect diagnosis since they are dealing with a mix of correct and incorrect packets.
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Figure 7: (a) Variation of Latency with Data Rate and (b) Diagnosis Accuracy with Burst
Length for Optimistic and Pessimistic Approaches
5.6

Accuracy and Latency Results for TRAM‐D

In this set of experiments we measure the accuracy and latency of the pessimistic approach of
the diagnosis protocol on TRAM, while performing specific fault injection, namely, reducing the
data rate from the sender. The latency and accuracy values are averaged over 200 diagnosis
instances for each data rate. Figure 8(a) shows that the accuracy of diagnosis drops from a high
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of 98% at 15 KB/s to 91% for 50 KB/s. As the data rate increases, the creation of links in the
causal graph gets delayed as incoming packets are pushed off to a buffer for subsequent
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Figure 8: (a) Diagnosis Accuracy and (b) Latency variation with increasing data rate in
TRAM
If a diagnosis is triggered which needs to follow one of the missing links, it results in an
incomplete diagnosis, leading to a drop in accuracy. Figure 8(b) shows the latency of diagnosis
with increasing data rate. Intuitively when the data rate increases, increasing load on the Monitor
should cause the latency to increase. However, the data rate used is low enough that it has no
significant effect.
6

RELATED WORK

Different problem. Prior to diagnosis is detection of failures, whether accidental or malicious.
There is a plethora of work on failure detection using heart beats, watchdogs, and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS). They differ in the level of intrusiveness with respect to the application
entities. Interestingly, the automated response mechanisms associated with many detectors take
local responses assuming the detection site is the origin of the fault with no error propagation.
This is clearly a leap of faith as has been shown repeatedly ([28], [29]).
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Different approaches to same problem.

Diagnosis in distributed systems has been an

important problem area and was first addressed in a seminal paper by Preparata et al. [20] known
as the PMC method. The PMC approach, along with several other deterministic models [10],
assumes tests to be perfect and mandates that each entity be tested a fixed number of times. The
fault model assumed is often restrictive, such as permanent failures [24]. Probabilistic diagnosis
was first introduced in [21]. Probabilistic diagnosis can only diagnose faulty nodes with a high
probability but can relax assumptions about the nature of the fault (intermittent faulty nodes can
be diagnosed) and the structure of the testing graph. Follow up work focused on multiple
syndrome testing [22], [26] where multiple syndromes were generated for the same node
proceeding in multiple lock steps. Both use the comparison based testing approach whereby a
test workload is executed by multiple nodes and a difference indicates suspicion of failure. The
probabilistic diagnosis algorithms have been categorized in terms of the level of knowledge
needed by each node, the least knowledge being m-threshold local diagnosis (3AM). Our
proposed Monitor framework, while being fundamentally different in approach, falls in this
category with respect to required knowledge. We have shown that it obeys the property of most
probable diagnosis as discussed in [26], while being non intrusive and providing practical tests.
The goal of the work in [19] is to localize faults in communicating network objects, given alerts
that are generated by the objects themselves and that may be inaccurate. The approach is
centralized and assumes dependencies between the objects are known a priori. The membership
and system diagnosis problems are viewed in a unified framework in [11]. More recently the
authors in [33] propose a fully distributed algorithm that allows every fault-free node to achieve
diagnosis in, at most, (log N)2 testing rounds. All of these approaches are fundamentally different
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from ours since the tested and the testing systems are the same and the explicit tests for diagnosis
make the process intrusive to the tested entity.
Similar approach to different problem. There has been considerable work on diagnosing
performance problems in distributed systems. They can be classified into active probing or
perturbation and passive monitoring approaches. In the first class, in [30][31], the authors use
respectively fault injection and forcible locks on shared objects to determine the location of
performance bottlenecks. The second approach uses execution traces for black-box applications
and has similarities to the Monitor approach ([32][34][35]). For example, in [32], the debugging
system performs analysis of message traces to determine the causes of long latencies. However,
in all of this work, the goal is not diagnosis of faults, but deduction of dependencies in
distributed systems which may enable humans to debug performance problems. These may be
regarded as point solutions in the broader class of diagnosis problems.
TTCB. There is an abundance of work on consensus. Consensus has been applied to various
kinds of environments, with different timing assumptions and types of failures, ranging from
crash to arbitrary (see [23] for a survey of early work). Our approach of using TTCBs on the
Monitor replicas for atomic multicast is derived from the work in [16][17], which showed how
consensus can be achieved in a hybrid failure and communication model system.
7

CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a Monitor system for distributed diagnosis of failures in the protocol entities

in a distributed application. The overall system is structured as a payload system and a Monitor
system each of which may fail in arbitrary ways. The demonstration is given for a streaming
video application running on top of a reliable multicast protocol called TRAM. The hierarchical
Monitor system is shown to be able to perform diagnosis in the presence of error propagation and
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using cooperation between the individual Monitor elements. The diagnosis accuracy is higher
than 90% for the streaming video application under a large range of scenarios. Next, we plan to
explore the cooperative testing by multiple Monitors, testing in the face of uncertain information,
and effect of placement of the Monitors.
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